Abstract-The known secret-sharing schemes for most access structures are not efficient; even for a one-bit secret the length of the shares in the schemes is 2 O(n) , where n is the number of participants in the access structure. It is a long standing open problem to improve these schemes or prove that they cannot be improved. The best known lower bound is by Csirmaz, who proved that there exist access structures with n participants such that the size of the share of at least one party is n= log n times the secret size. Csirmaz's proof uses Shannon information inequalities, which were the only information inequalities known when Csirmaz published his result. On the negative side, Csirmaz proved that by only using Shannon information inequalities one cannot prove a lower bound of !(n) on the share size. In the last decade, a sequence of non-Shannon information inequalities were discovered. In fact, it was proved that there are infinity many independent information inequalities even in four variables. This raises the hope that these inequalities can help in improving the lower bounds beyond n. However, we show that any information inequality with four or five variables cannot prove a lower bound of !(n) on the share size. In addition, we show that the same negative result holds for all information inequalities with more than five variables that are known to date.
I. INTRODUCTION
A SECRET-SHARING scheme is a mechanism for sharing a secret string among a set of participants such that only predefined authorized subsets of participants can reconstruct the string, while any other subset has absolutely no information on the string. The collection of authorized subsets is called an access structure. For example, in a -out-of-threshold secret-sharing scheme, the access structure contains all subsets of size at least . As an interesting "real-world" illustration of this situation: According to Time Magazine, control of the nuclear weapons in Russia in the early 1990s depended upon a similar "two-out-of-tree" access mechanism, where the three parties were the President, the Defense Minister, and the Defense Ministry. Secret-sharing schemes, introduced by The authors are with the Department of Computer Science, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Be'er Sheva, Israel (e-mail: amos.beimel@gmail.com; ilanorv@cs.bgu.ac.il).
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[1]- [3] , are nowadays used in many cryptographic protocols, e.g., Byzantine agreement [4] , secure multiparty computations [5] - [7] , threshold cryptography [8] , access control [9] , and attribute-based encryption [10] , [11] . An important issue in secret-sharing schemes is the size of the shares distributed to the participants. For most access structures, even the best known secret-sharing schemes (e.g., [12] - [16] ) are not efficient; the length of the shares for sharing an -bit secret is , where is the number of participants in the access structure. The best lower bound was proved by Csirmaz [17] ; he proved that for each there exists an access structure with participants such that any secret-sharing scheme with an -bit secret requires shares of length . There is a large gap between the upper bounds and the lower bounds. Closing this gap is a major open problem.
It is convenient to formalize the correctness and privacy in secret-sharing schemes via the entropy function. Starting from the works of Karnin et al. [18] and Capocelli et al. [19] , the entropy was used to prove lower bounds on the share size in secretsharing schemes [20] , [21] , [17] , [22] . Specifically, Csirmaz's proof [17] uses only Shannon information inequalities, which were the only information inequalities known when Csirmaz published his result (this is true also for all the previous works mentioned above). On the negative side, Csirmaz proved that by using only Shannon information inequalities one cannot prove a lower bound of on the share size. In the last decade, a sequence of non-Shannon information inequalities were discovered. This raises the hope that these inequalities can help in improving the lower bounds beyond . However, in this paper we show that all the information inequalities with four or five variables cannot prove a lower bound of on the share size even if used simultaneously.
A. Related Work
Threshold secret-sharing schemes, in which a subset is authorized if and only if its size is larger than some threshold, were independently introduced by Shamir [1] and Blakley [2] about 30 years ago. General secret sharing schemes were presented by Ito, Saito, and Nishizeki [3] ; they also presented constructions of a secret-sharing scheme for every monotone access structure. More efficient schemes were presented in, e.g., [12] - [14] , [16] , and [15] . However, even these better constructions are not efficient and, for most access structure, the shares' size is exponential in the number of parties. Lower bounds for secret-sharing schemes were presented in [20] , [19] , [21] , [17] , and [22] ; however, as aforementioned, there is a big gap between the upper and lower bounds. Superpolynomial lower bounds for linear secret-sharing schemes were presented in [23] and [24] .
0018-9448/$26.00 © 2011 IEEE In this paper, we discuss using information inequalities for proving lower bounds on the share size in secret-sharing schemes. An information inequality is a linear inequality over the entropy of subsets of variables that holds for any random variables (for a formal definition see Section II-B). For example is an information inequality. Many inequalities can be expressed as a linear combination of a single inequality involving the conditional mutual information, namely,
. Such inequalities are known as Shannon inequalities. It was an open problem for many years if there are information inequalities that are not implied by Shannon inequalities, i.e., if there are non-Shannon inequalities. The first non-Shannon inequality was given by Zhang and Yeung [25] . In the last decade, several additional non-Shannon inequalities were discovered [26] - [30] . Matúš [31] has proved that there are infinitely many independent information inequalities with four variables.
Several papers have dealt with the characterization of information inequalities. Chan and Yeung [32] have characterized information inequalities using group-theoretic inequalities. Chan [33] has shown that every information inequality is associated with a "balanced" information inequality and a set of "residual weights." Moreover, Chan showed that, in order to prove that a certain information inequality is valid it is necessary and sufficient to prove that its "balanced" version is valid and all its residual weights are nonnegative. Hammer, Romashchenko, Shen, and Vereshchagin [34] proved that Kolmogorov complexity inequalities are information inequalities and vice versa.
A rank inequality is a linear inequality over the ranks of subspaces of a vector space that holds for any subspaces of vectors. We use rank inequalities to prove our results for information inequalities. A key result of [34] that is relevant to our work states that all information inequalities are also ranks inequalities. However, the opposite is not true, as there are rank inequalities that are not information inequalities, e.g., the Ingleton inequality [35] . More rank inequalities were presented in [36] . Hammer et al. [34] proved that any rank inequality with four variables can be expressed as a nonnegative linear combination of the Ingleton inequality and the Shannon inequalities. Recently, Dougherty, Freiling, and Zeger [30] proved a similar result for rank inequalities with five variables. They gave a list of 24 rank inequalities with five variables which, together with the Shannon inequalities and the Ingleton inequality [35] , generate all rank inequalities with five variables. Hence, any information inequality with five variables can be expressed as a nonnegative linear combination of the list of 24 inequalities, the Ingleton inequality, and the Shannon inequalities.
The information inequality of Zhang and Yeung [25] and other information inequalities were used in several areas. They were used by Dougherty, Freiling, and Zeger [37] and by Chan and Grant [38] to prove bounds on the capacity of network coding, by Matúš [39] to prove that a function is not asymptotically entropic, and by Riis [40] to prove bounds on graph entropy of certain graphs. Furthermore, they were used by Beimel, Livne, and Padró [41] and later by Metcalf-Burton [42] to prove lower bounds on the size of shares in secret-sharing schemes; they proved that there is a matroidial access structure-the Vamos access structure-that is not nearly ideal. We observe that the information inequalities of [25] , [28] can be used to prove that other matroidial access structures are not nearly ideal, e.g., the access structures induced by the matroids AG32r, F8, Q8 (for the definitions of these matroids see [43] ).
Our paper deals with limitations of the techniques for proving lower bounds on the size of shares in secret-sharing schemes, similar to the work of Beimel and Franklin [44] , which considered weakly private secret-sharing schemes. In such schemes any unauthorized set can never rule-out any secret (however, it might deduce, for example, that one secret is much less likely than other secrets). They show efficient constructions of weakly private secret-sharing schemes (for large secret domains), implying that for proving lower bounds on the shares' size in secret-sharing schemes one must use the strong privacy requirement of secret-sharing schemes.
B. Our Results
In contrast to the success of applying the known information inequalities to proving lower bounds in several areas, we show that they cannot help in proving lower bounds of on the share size in secret-sharing schemes. Let us elaborate on our proof. Csirmaz [17] in 1994 has proved his lower bound by translating the question of proving lower bounds on shares' size to proving that a certain linear programming instance does not have a small solution. Csirmaz constructed the linear program by using Shannon inequalities, which were the only information inequalities known in 1994. Using this framework, he proved a lower bound of times the secret size for an access structure with parties. Furthermore, nearly all previous lower bounds, e.g., [18] - [21] , can be restated using Csirmaz's framework with Shannon inequalities. On the other hand, Csirmaz proved that for every access structure the linear program has a solution in which the objective function has value , implying that his framework cannot prove lower bounds of . In the last decade, a sequence of non-Shannon information inequalities were discovered [25] - [30] . This gives hope that, by adding these inequalities to the linear program, one could prove better lower bounds on the share size. However, in this work we show that Csirmaz's solution to the linear program remains valid even after adding simultaneously all possible information inequalities with four or five variables and all the information inequalities with more than five variables known to date-the infinite sequences of information inequalities presented in [25] , [27] , and [26] .
Our proof that Csirmaz's solution for the linear program remains valid after adding the new inequalities is much more involved than Csirmaz's proof for Shannon inequalities. We present a brute-force algorithm that checks if Csirmaz's solution remains valid given an inequality. The algorithm uses the above mentioned connection between information inequalities and rank inequalities. In addition, we use the fact that if a finite collection of inequalities has the property that the Csirmaz's solution remains valid given each one of the inequalities, then Csirmaz's solution for the linear program remains valid after adding all the inequalities. Thus, it suffices to independently check that Csirmaz's solution is compatible with each inequality. Recall that there are infinitely many independent information inequalities in 4 and 5 variables and their characterization is unknown. We use rank inequalities in 4 and 5 variables, which are characterized by a finite set of inequalities, to bypass this problem.
We executed this algorithm, using a computer program, on the Ingleton inequality [35] . Next, we executed this algorithm on the 24 rank inequalities with five variables of [30] , which, together with the Shannon and Ingleton inequalities, generate all rank inequalities with up to five variables (hence, all information inequalities with up to 5 variables). For the infinite sequences of information inequalities of [25] , [27] , and [26] , we manually executed the algorithm on a symbolic representation of the inequalities. For all these executions the result is the same-each inequality cannot help. By [34] , the fact that the Ingleton inequality and Shannon inequalities cannot help implies that any information inequality with four variables cannot help in proving lower bounds of . Similarly, by [30] , the fact that the 24 rank inequalities with five variables cannot help implies that any information inequality with five variables cannot help in proving lower bounds of . The conclusion is that all possible information inequalities with four or five variables and the known infinite sequences of information inequalities cannot help in proving lower bounds of even when used simultaneously.
Although we have checked all known information inequalities known to date, in [30] there is partial list of rank inequalities with six variables. Although those inequalities valid as rank inequalities and not information inequalities, we would like to run our algorithm on them. Unfortunately, our algorithm is highly inefficient and its running time is doubly-exponential in the number of variables in the inequality. For known non-Shannon information inequalities with 4 or 5 variables, executing the computer program returns an answer in a reasonable time (less than a day). However, running the computer program on inequalities with 6 variables takes too long, and we could not check if they cannot help in proving lower bounds of . Rank inequalities can be used to prove lower bounds on the share size in linear secret-sharing schemes, which is a class of secret-sharing schemes that contains nearly all known secretsharing schemes (e.g., the schemes of [12] , [2] , [13] , [14] , [16] , [15] , and [45] ). In linear scheme, the distribution and reconstruction of the secret is a linear mapping and they are equivalent to monotone span programs [15] . Furthermore, the linearity of the schemes is used in many applications of secret-sharing schemes (e.g., in protocols of [7] for secure function evaluation against general adversarial structures). The best lower bounds for linear secret-secret sharing schemes are times the size of the secret [24] (improving on [23] , [46] , see also [47] ). Improving the lower bounds to times the size of the secret for an explicit access structure is an open problem. Our results imply that the rank inequalities with at most 5 variables cannot prove such lower bounds or even lower bounds of . We end the introduction with a few remarks. First, one cannot interpret our result as suggesting that information inequalities cannot help in improving the lower bounds. To the contrary, the conclusion of our paper is that new information inequalities with many variables should be sought. Hopefully, these new information inequalities would not be ruled-out by our algorithm. However, not failing the test in our algorithm is only the first step. Our algorithm only gives a necessary condition for an information inequality to be helpful in proving lower bounds of on the share size. To use new inequalities, one has to prove that for some access structure the linear program with the new inequalities, and possibly with all the known inequalities, has only large solutions.
Organization. In Section II, we provide necessary definitions from information theory and define secret-sharing schemes. In Section III, we discuss Csirmaz's framework for proving lower bounds and its limitation when using Shannon's information inequalities. In Section IV, we prove some simple properties of information inequalities and define when an inequality (e.g., information inequality or rank inequality) is compatible with Csirmaz function, which means that the inequality cannot help in proving lower bounds of on the share size. In Section V, we demonstrate our method by showing that a Shannon inequality and the Ingleton inequality [35] cannot help. In Section VI we present the algorithm that checks if an inequality cannot help and we conclude that all possible information inequalities with four or five variables and all information inequalities with more than five variables known to date cannot help in proving lower bounds of . Finally, in Section VII we define linear secret-sharing and monotone span programs and discuss the connection between rank inequalities and lower bounds for linear secret-sharing schemes.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we review the relevant definitions from information theory and define secret-sharing schemes.
A. Basic Definitions From Information Theory
We next provide the basic concepts of Information Theory used in this paper. For a complete treatment of this subject see, e.g., [48] . All the logarithms here are of base 2.
The entropy of a random variable is
It can be proved that where is the support of (the values with probability greater than zero [49] .
In this paper, we use the connection between information inequalities and rank inequalities. We next define rank inequalities. Let be vector spaces over some field. Denote by , the space spanned by the vectors in , and by the rank of a space .
Definition 2.2 (A Rank Inequality):
An inequality over vector spaces, defined by constants , where , is a rank inequality if holds for every field and every vector spaces over .
Claim 2.3 ([34]):
Let be an information inequality over random variables. Then, the corresponding inequality is a rank inequality. The proof of 2.3 is similar to the transformation, presented in Section VII, between a monotone span program (Definition 7.2) and its induced linear secret-sharing scheme (Definition 7.3). That is, it is shown that there exist random variables such that . A distribution scheme with domain of secrets is a pair, where is a probability distribution on some finite set called the set of random strings and is a mapping from to a set of -tuples , where is called the share-domain of . A dealer distributes a secret according to by first sampling a string according to , computing a vector of shares , and privately communicating to party , where is called the share of .
C. Secret Sharing Definition 2.4 (Access Structure and Distribution Scheme):
We next define secret-sharing schemes using the entropy function. It is convenient to view the secret as the share of the dealer , and for every set to consider the vector of shares of . Any probability distribution on the domain of secrets, together with the distribution scheme , induces, for any , a probability distribution on the vector of shares of the parties in . We denote the random variable taking values according to this probability distribution on the vector of shares of by , and by the random variable denoting the secret (i.e., ).
Definition 2.5 (Secret-Sharing Scheme):
We say that a distribution scheme is a secret-sharing scheme realizing an access structure with respect to a given probability distribution on the secrets, denoted by a random variable , if the following conditions hold.
CORRECTNESS. For every authorized set
, the shares of the parties in determine the secret, i.e., . PRIVACY. For every unauthorized set , the shares of the parties in do not disclose any information on the secret, that is, .
Remark 2.6:
Although the above definition considers a specific distribution on the secrets, Blundo et al. [50] proved that its correctness and privacy are actually independent of this distribution: If a scheme realizes an access structure with respect to one distribution on the secrets, then it realizes the access structure with respect to any distribution with the same support. Furthermore, the above definition is equivalent to the definition of [51] - [53] , where there is no probability distribution associated with the secrets and it is required that the probability of every vector of shares of an unauthorized set is the same given any secret.
Karnin et al. [18] have showed that for each nonredundant party (that is, a party that appears in at least one minimal authorized set)
, which implies that the size of the share of the party is at least the size of the secret.
III. CSIRMAZ'S FRAMEWORK FOR PROVING LOWER BOUNDS AND ITS LIMITATIONS

A. Csirmaz's Framework for Proving Lower Bounds
Csirmaz [17] has proved the best known lower bounds on the size of the shares in secret-sharing schemes. Toward this goal, he (implicitly) presented a framework for proving lower bounds and showed how to implement this framework to prove lower bounds for a specific access structure. The idea of the framework of Csirmaz is to construct a linear program such that lower bounds on the value of the objective function in this program imply lower bounds on the share size.
In order to present the framework of Csirmaz we start with some notation. Given an access structure and a secret-sharing scheme realizing it, define the function for every . The correctness and privacy of the secret-sharing scheme can be translated to constrains on the function . Namely, as proved in Claim 3.3, for each .
, then . Proving lower bounds on the size of the shares is equivalent to proving that any random variables (i.e., shares) satisfying the above equalities imply that is large. To obtain lower bounds, these constrains are translated to a linear program using known properties of the entropy function, namely, information inequalities. That is, we get a set of linear inequalities, where we want to minimize . Csirmaz has constructed an access structure that implies a linear program in which , thus, for at least one party . This implies that in every secret-sharing scheme realizing with an -bit secret, the share of at least one party is an -bit string. We next formally define and describe Csirmaz's framework.
Definition 3.1:
Given a secret-sharing scheme over parties, define the function as follow: for every .
Claim 3.2 ([54]):
The function defined above has the following properties:
• for all and , • for every . • for every . These properties are called nonnegativity, monotonicity, and submodularity, respectively.
A function that assigns real numbers to subsets of a finite set and satisfies these 3 properties is called polymatroid. Thus, Claim 3.2 can be rephrased, saying that the entropy functions defines a polymatroid. Furthermore, the above 3 properties implies the basic inequalities of information theory, namely, that the entropy, conditional entropy, mutual information, and conditional mutual information are nonnegative (see [49] 
The first case is when . Therefore, . Therefore, we assume that and (since ). Next assume that . In this case , since . Therefore, . Next assume that and . Therefore, and the solution holds. Finally, assume that but . In this case, and . For the submodularity inequality, the proof is similar and therefore omitted. The target function in both linear programs is the same and does not depend on any variable that correspond to a set such that , therefore, the minimum values of the objective function in both linear programs are equal.
The linear program in Definition 3.7 involves less variables compared to Definition 3.4. In addition, working with the former linear program is more convenient. Therefore, from now on, we will use the program in Definition 3.7.
B. Limitation of Shannon Inequalities
Csirmaz [17] has proved that using his framework with only Shannon inequalities (which were the only information inequalities known when he published his result) one cannot prove lower bounds of . That is, using only Shannon inequalities his lower bound is the best possible up to a factor of . In this section we explain how Csirmaz proved this limitation and give some of the intuition for that proof. Informally, Csirmaz presented a solution satisfying all the inequalities in the linear program of Definition 3.7. Interestingly, the same solution is valid for all access structures. In this paper, we prove that information inequalities and rank inequalities cannot help in proving lower bounds of on the share size. Specifically, we augment the linear programs of Definition 3.4 and Definition 3.7 with additional information inequalities and show that the objective function of the program is small: The solution of Csirmaz, in which for , remains a valid solution to the augmented programs. To show the above result, is suffices to show that the solution if Csirmaz satisfies each inequality we add. We supply an algorithm that given an inequality, checks if the inequality is compatible with Csirmaz solution. For this algorithm to work we need that the inequality is a set-size inequality, that is, it is valid whenever we plug-in sizes of sets (see Definition 4.2). We prove that all information inequality and rank inequality are set-size inequalities. Thus, we can execute our algorithm on each such inequality.
We start with some notation; using this notation we will define two quantities for an inequality, and . These quantities are used to define when an inequality is compatible with Csirmaz function. 
Lemma 4.4:
Let be a rank inequality. Then, for every sets , i.e., the rank inequality is a set-size inequality. Proof: Choose any independent vectors from for some finite field . Define the vector spaces for each . Thus, for each is the space spanned by the vectors and . Since the rank inequality holds for every vector spaces, the lemma follows.
By Claim 2.3 every information inequality is a rank inequality. Therefore, by Lemma 4.4 we deduce the following.
Lemma 4.5:
Let be an information inequality. Then, for every sets , i.e., the information inequality is a set-size inequality. Given the linear programs defined in Definition 3.4 and Definition 3.7, we want to ask if after adding an inequality (e.g., an information inequality or rank inequality) Csirmaz . By claim 4.7, the two programs are equivalent.
The value of depends on the coefficients of the inequality and the two decision: which sets are in the access structure and which sets contain the dealer. Observe that the value of does not depend on the size of the sets. Furthermore, can be negative, positive, or equal to zero. If is negative, then with the current choices it is not useful since we have . As we will see later, the inequality can be useful only when . That is, we will show that for every information inequality Csirmaz solution satisfies . We next want to check if an inequality with is compatible with Csirmaz solution. Towards this goal we define , which is the value of an inequality with Csirmaz function.
Definition 4.8:
Let be a set-size inequality. For sets and , define as . In the next claim we prove a technical result that will be useful later on.
Claim 4.9: Let be a set-size inequality. Then, for every .
Proof:
Since the inequality is a set-size inequality, , therefore, .
For every , the size depends on some of the sizes of the intersections between the sets . There- Csirmaz has suggested a specific function, defined in Definition 3.10, in order to show the limitations of Shannon information inequalities. We will prove in Lemma 6.2 that any set-size inequality remains valid after plugging in the Csirmaz function. That is, if the inequality is a set-size inequality, then . So, our only hope is that for some sets , but, is negative (or "small"). If this condition does not hold, then the inequality is compatible with Csirmaz function. We next define two definitions for compatibility with Csirmaz function. Our algorithm examines the compatibility with Csirmaz function according to the weakest definition in order to simplify its execution.
Definition 4.12:
We say that an inequality is -compatible with Csirmaz function if for every sets and for every access structure , where and .
Theorem 4.13:
Let be a constant. Consider a collection of set-size inequalities, where each inequality in the collection is -compatible with Csirmaz function. Then, this collection of inequalities cannot help improving the lower bounds beyond even when each inequality is added simultaneously with every sets . Proof: Consider an access structure and the "huge" linear program obtained for this access structure by applying each inequality in the collection to every choice of subsets of the parties. That is, we consider the linear program defined in Definition 3.7, in which for every set-size inequality in the collection and every sets , we take and add the inequality , where
. By Claim 4.7, this is equivalent to adding to the program. We take , for every and we get a solution that satisfies each inequality in the program. In this solution . Thus, using this linear program one cannot prove lower bounds better than When dealing with a finite collection of inequalities, one can use a rougher notion than an inequality that is -compatible with Csirmaz function. Checking that an inequality is compatible with Csirmaz function using this rougher notion takes less time. then there exists a constant as shown in Corollary 6.3 (proved later) that depends only on the coefficients of the inequality (and, therefore, independent of the access structure and the number of parties in the access structure) such that . Thus, the inequality is -compatible with Csirmaz function for some constant . If we consider a finite collection of inequalities, such that each inequality in the collection is compatible with Csirmaz function, then there is a constant such that each inequality in the collection is -compatible with Csirmaz function, and we can apply Theorem 4.13. Therefore, when dealing with a finite collection of inequalities, we will check that each inequality in the collection is compatible with Csirmaz function; this is easier than calculating the minimal for each inequality.
V. EXAMPLES OF INEQUALITIES THAT CANNOT HELP IN PROVING STRONG LOWER BOUNDS
In this section, we demonstrate our method for proving that an inequality is compatible with Csirmaz function (i.e., cannot help in improving the lower bounds beyond ) by considering two examples. First, we will demonstrate the calculations and the technique that we will use later on a simple Shannon inequality. The fact that this inequality cannot help in improving the lower bounds beyond follows from Csirmaz's proof that using only Shannon inequalities one cannot prove better lower bounds. We reprove this result in order to supply a simple example of our method. Next, in Section V-B we consider the Ingleton rank inequality [35] -the first known rank inequality which is not an information inequality. We prove that also this rank inequality is compatible with Csirmaz function, thus, cannot help in proving lower bounds of .
A. A Simple Shannon Inequality Cannot Help in Proving Strong Lower Bounds
We consider the submodularity inequality for two sets . This inequality follows from the fact that the conditional mutual information is nonnegative. Let and . We should calculate for (using Notation 4.10). By Obseration 4.11, , and . 1 Therefore
Assume that . Thus, . Before calculating we have to decide which sets are in the access structure. If , then also . Thus, , and . Therefore, and we can deduce that this inequality is compatible with Csirmaz function using these selections. However, if , but , then , and . Therefore, as needed. But the selection of and implies that , which means that and , thus, as well. In other words, using these selections the inequality is compatible with Csirmaz function. Moreover, for every other set of selections, the inequality is compatible with Csirmaz function.
To conclude, given an inequality we want while . By different choices of which sets are in the access structure and which sets contain the dealer we get different values of . We want choices that maximize . However, by choosing, for example, while , we must have that . Thus, the choices of which sets are in the access structure force that certain sets are nonempty, which might imply that .
B. The Ingleton Inequality Cannot Help in Proving Strong Lower Bounds
We next prove that the Ingleton inequality is compatible with Csirmaz function.
Theorem 5.1 (The Ingleton Inequality [35]): For every four vector spaces
, and , the following inequality holds:
For every four sets we can consider the corresponding set-size inequality (3) By choosing which sets contain the dealer and which sets are in the access structure we get different values of . We next apply the Csirmaz function on Inequality (3). We use the same process described above on each one of the terms of (3). After simplifications, we get the following polynomial , where , which is a multivariate polynomial whose variables are .
After applying the Csirmaz function we get a polynomial of degree 2 such that all of its coefficients are nonnegative. We are looking for the following situation: while . Since all coefficients are nonnegative and for every , the value of is zero if every monomial in is zero. In particular, every term or in has to be equal to zero. If the coefficient is positive, then must hold. Thus, the terms in the last line of polynomial above has to be equal to zero, i.e.,
. Let be the polynomial after setting these variables to be zero, that is
The polynomial should be zero, therefore, in the inequality above at least one of the variables (i.e., set size) in each monomial has to be zero (e.g., or ). We use a brute-force algorithm for checking if it is possible that while . We have two decisions to make: • For each we should decide if or not.
• We have to decide which sets are in the access structure.
Specifically, for each such that in the information inequality, we need to decide whether or . These decisions should be consistent with the constrains that some sets have size zero. . Assume that and are the minimal sets in the in the access structure. Thus, the sets that are in the access structure are exactly those that include at least one of or . After making these decisions we compute as specified in Definition 4.6, , and as needed. But, while . This means that . In a similar way, while . This means that . Combining these two constraints and recalling that , we get , which implies . Thus, in this case, the inequality is compatible with Csirmaz function. , let . Assume that is the only minimal set in the in the access structure. This means that the sets that are in the access structure are exactly those that include . For example, . After making these two decisions we compute . Thus, in this case, the inequality is compatible with Csirmaz function. We have written a computer program that checks all the possibilities for including the dealer in the sets and for which sets are in the access structure. The computer program showed that for each possible combination either or (or both). This means that the Csirmaz function is still a solution to the linear program and this inequality is compatible with Csirmaz function.
VI. ANY POSSIBLE INFORMATION INEQUALITY WITH FOUR OR FIVE VARIABLES AND ALL OTHERS KNOWN TO DATE CANNOT HELP IN PROVING STRONG LOWER BOUNDS
In this section we describe an algorithm that checks if an inequality is compatible with Csirmaz function and therefore cannot help in proving lower bounds of . Before presenting these results, we show how to compute the polynomial efficiently and analyze its properties.
A. Properties of the Polynomial
For every set-size inequality and for every sets we consider the quantity where . By Obseration 4.11,
. Thus, we consider as a polynomial in the variables . We start with proving properties of this polynomial that will be useful in the design of the algorithm.
Lemma 6.1:
For every set-size inequality, the polynomial is a multivariate polynomial with total degree 2. Furthermore, the coefficient of every monomial in is nonnegative and can be efficiently calculated from the inequality (without applying the Csirmaz function). Proof: The fact that the polynomial is a multivariate polynomial with total degree 2 can be deduced from the structure of the Csirmaz function (see Definition 3.10) , that is, is a sum of polynomials , where is polynomial of degree 2. Next, we compute the coefficients of . Recall that .
We can now compute the coefficients of the monomials of the polynomial 1) : In this case , i.e., the sum of the coefficients of sets that include . By Lemma 4.3 this sum is nonnegative.
2)
: In this case , again, this is the sum of the coefficients of sets that include .
3)
: In this case . That is, is the sum of coefficients of sets that include at least one of and , and, by Lemma 4.3, .
As all the coefficients in are nonnegative and all the values of are nonnegative, its value is always nonnegative. That is, using Claim 4.9 Lemma 6.2: Let be a set-size inequality. Then, for every sets , where . In the Appendix we present another proof of this lemma that, in some sense, is more elegant than this proof. Lemma 6.2 implies that if we choose for every , then and . That is, Csirmaz function satisfies the inequality. The proof of Lemma 6.1 provides us the exact structure of the polynomial , hence, we can obtain the following corollary, which was used in Obseration 4.16. is the set of coefficients of the polynomial . By Lemma 6.1, all these coefficients are nonnegative. If , then there exists a positive coefficient and the minimum in the corollary is well defined. Furthermore, the assignment to each variable in is a nonnegative integer. Thus, if is positive for some sets , then at least one monomial is positive. This monomial contributes at least its coefficient and the corollary follows.
B. Algorithms for Checking If an Inequality Is Compatible With Csirmaz Function
We next present two algorithms that check if a set-size inequality is compatible with Csirmaz function:
• An algorithm that calculates the maximum such that inequality is -compatible with Csirmaz function; this algorithm appears in Fig. 2 .
• An algorithm that checks if an inequality is compatible with Csirmaz function; this algorithm appears in Fig. 3 . The algorithms are brute-force algorithms that check, for each possible choice of adding the dealer or not adding the dealer to each set and for each possible choice or for each , if while it is possible that (respectively, ). To check if can equal 0 under some a specific choice, we check for each choice and for each if (1) under this choice, and (2) this choice is consistent with the choice of sets that are in the access structure.
Clearly, the first algorithm that appears in Fig. 2 outputs much more information. However, its running time is worse than the running time of the second algorithm that appears in Fig. 3 .
Remark 6.4: The algorithms described above are highly inefficient. However, for our work-checking information inequalities with four or five variables-the algorithm that appears in Fig. 3 is good enough. On the other hand, the algorithm that appears in Fig. 2 is not efficient enough to be executed even on the inequalities with four or five variables.
In [30] there are rank inequalities with six variables. Although those inequalities are only rank inequalities and are not information inequalities, we would like to run our algorithm on them. Unfortunately, the running of the computer program executing the algorithm on them takes too long, and we could not verify if they are compatible with Csirmaz function, i.e., if they cannot help in proving lower bounds of .
C. Dealing With the Known Infinite Collections of Information Inequalities
There are examples of infinite sequences of non-Shannon inequalities with more than 5 variables. The first infinite sequence of non-Shannon inequalities was discovered by Zhang and Yeung in [25] ; they show for every an information inequality with variables. Sequences of non-Shannon information inequalities generalizing the result of [25] appear in [26] and [27] . We will show that these sequences are compatible with Csirmaz function. We note that an infinite sequence of non-Shannon information inequalities with four variables was given in [29] , however, according to Corollary 6.7, as all the inequalities in this sequence have four variables, they are compatible with Csirmaz function and cannot help in proving lower bounds of on the size of the shares. The infinite sequence presented in [27] is more general than the infinite sequences presented in [25] and [26] . We next explain in more details the technique that was used to check that the infinite sequence presented in [27] is -compatible with Csirmaz function for some . We first present the sequence of inequalities.
Theorem 6.5 ([27]):
Let be discrete random variables where . The following inequality holds:
We consider the corresponding set inequality with sets . Roughly speaking, in order to check if these inequalities are compatible with Csirmaz function, we computed for each one of them the symbolic polynomial and proved that there is a constant such that for any number of variables the information inequality is -compatible with Csirmaz function. It seems that it is a complex mission to manually execute an algorithm which among others things should consider coefficients, combination of choosing which sets contains the dealer, and combination for choosing the access structure. However, a closer look at the inequalities reveals that each inequality has a very symmetric structure. Specifically, each one of the sets for has the same "role" in the inequality and therefore the corresponding sizes , which involve some of the sets , have the same contribution to the polynomial . Therefore, roughly speaking, both of the decision which sets are in the access structure and which sets contains the dealer, can be simplified to the following two qualitative decision: how many sets are in the access structure and how many sets in contain the dealer. For example, assume that for each , and, in addition, assume that . Recall that , therefore, as part of the calculation of , we have to calculate the value which is exactly the number of how many of the s contains the dealer and is independent of which of the s contains the dealer. After applying those ideas, for these sequences the result is that there is a constant such that every inequality in the sequence is -compatible with Csirmaz function. Theorem 6.6: There exists a constant such that the known to date infinite sequences of non-Shannon information inequalities of [25] , [27] , and [26] are -compatible with Csirmaz function.
D. Main Result
Recall that according to Remark 6.4 it is sufficient to execute the algorithm appearing in Fig. 3 in order to check that an inequality with four or five variables are compatible with Csirmaz function. However, for the case of the infinite sequences of information inequalities we have to execute the algorithm appearing in Fig. 2 . We next describe precisely our actions and results which could be divided into three:
Information Inequalities with Four Variables. We executed the algorithm that appears in Fig. 3 on the Ingleton inequality [35] and got that the Ingleton inequality is compatible with Csirmaz function. In addition, all Shannon inequalities are compatible with Csirmaz function. To prove that all information inequalities with four variables are compatible with Csirmaz function we have to rely on few facts. First, any information inequality is a rank inequality. Second, as proved in [34] , any rank inequality with four variables can be expressed as a nonnegative linear combination of the Ingleton inequality and the Shannon inequalities. Thus, in particular, any information inequality with 4 variables is nonnegative combination of the Ingleton inequality and Shannon inequality. Third, as we proved in Theorem 4.13, if a collection of inequalities, where each inequality in the collection is compatible with Csirmaz function, then they cannot help even if all inequalities are used simultaneously. All those three facts together prove that any possible information inequality with four variables (even if undiscovered) cannot help in prove a lower bounds of on the share size.
Information Inequalities with Five Variables. We executed the algorithm that appears in Fig. 3 on the 24 rank inequalities with five variables appearing in [30] . As proved in [30] , these inequalities, together with the Shannon inequalities and Ingleton inequality [35] , generate all rank inequalities with five variables. Similarly to the four variables case, we conclude that any possible information inequality with five variables (even the undiscovered) compatible with Csirmaz function, therefore, cannot help in proving lower bounds of even if used simultaneously.
Infinite Collections of Information Inequalities. As we described in Section VI-C it is sufficient to check the infinite sequence presented in [27] as it is more general than the infinite sequences of information inequalities of [25] and [26] . We manually executed the algorithm that appears in Fig. 2 on a symbolic representation of the inequalities. Although the sequence is infinite, we found a constant such that each information inequality in [27] is -compatible with Csirmaz function. Therefore, the conclusion is that all the known information inequalities cannot help in proving lower bounds of . We conclude that although there are infinitely many independent information inequalities with four or five variables, there exists a constant such that any possible rank inequality with four or five variables is -compatible with Csirmaz function. According to the discussion above, this proves the following corollary:
Corollary 6.7: There exists a constant such that any possible information inequality with four or five variables is -compatible with Csirmaz function. Using Theorem 6.6, Corollary 6.7, and Theorem 4.13, we conclude that any possible information inequality with four or five variables and all the information inequalities with more than five variables known to date cannot help in proving lower bounds of on the size of the shares in secret-sharing schemes.
Theorem 6.8: All information inequalities with four or five variables and the known to date information inequalities of [25] , [27] , and [26] with more than five variables cannot help in proving lower bounds of on the size of the shares in secret-sharing schemes even if they are used simultaneously.
VII. RANK INEQUALITIES, LINEAR SECRET SHARING, AND MONOTONE SPAN PROGRAMS
In this section we discuss the connection between our results and proving lower bounds for linear secret-sharing schemes. Furthermore, we explain that known lower bounds for linear secret sharing schemes might be used to derive new rank inequalities. We next define a linear algebraic model of computation called Monotone Span Programs [15] and a class of secret-sharing schemes based on vector spaces called linear secret-sharing schemes. As discussed here, these notions are basically equivalent.
Definition 7.1 (Linear Secret-Sharing Scheme):
A linear secret-sharing scheme is a secret-sharing scheme where:
• The domain of secrets is the elements of a finite field , • The random string is chosen from with uniform distribution for some integer ; each string is considered as field elements, • The share distribution function is a linear function of the secret and the field elements of the random string.
Definition 7.2 (Monotone Span Program): A monotone span program is a triple
, where is a field, is an matrix over , and labeling each row of by a party. 2 The size of is the number of rows of (i.e., ). For any set , let denote the sub-matrix obtained by restricting to the rows labeled by parties in . We say that accepts if the rows of span the vector . We denote by the collection of all sets in that are accepted by . We say that realizes if . Observe that for a monotone span program , the access structure is monotone. A monotone span program realizing implies a linear secret-sharing scheme for , as stated later.
Claim 7.3 ([13] , [15] ): Let be a monotone span program, where is a finite field and for every there are rows of labeled by . Then, there is a linear secret-sharing scheme realizing such that the share of party is composed of elements of . Proof sketch: Given a monotone span program , where is an matrix over , define a linear secret-sharing scheme as follows.
• Input: a secret .
• Choose random elements independently with uniform distribution from and define .
• Evaluate , and distribute to each player all entries corresponding to rows labeled by . In this linear secret-sharing scheme, every set in can reconstruct the secret: Let , thus, the rows of span , i.e., there exists some vector such that . Notice that the shares of the parties in are . The parties in can reconstruct the secret by computing since It can be shown that each set not in has no information on the secret; the details can be found in [15] .
Example 7.4:
We next give an example of the above construction. Let be a monotone span program, where the matrix and the labels are described below The three rows labeled by and span the target vector , however any other set of parties which does not contain does not span the vector , therefore is the only minimal set in . Assume that the secret is and the dealer chooses as the random elements, therefore . Next, the dealer calculates and gives the share to , the share to (this share contains two bits), and the share to .
Now the set of parties wants to reconstruct the secret. Notice that Thus, reconstruct the secret by computing as required. It follows [13] , [15] that for every linear secret-sharing scheme realizing an access structure , the linear map defining the distribution of the secret in the linear secret-sharing scheme defines a monotone span program such that . The size of the resulting monotone span program is exactly the number of field elements given to the parties as shares. Thus, in essence, monotone span programs and linear secret-sharing schemes are equivalent. Furthermore, in [55] it was shown that linear secret-sharing schemes are equivalent to secret-sharing schemes in which the reconstruction is linear.
Let be a monotone span program realizing . Define and as the space spanned by the rows in the monotone span program labeled by . As before, denotes the space spanned by for . By the definition of a monotone span program, for every the vectors in span if and only if , that is Thus, we can use the linear program defined in Definition 3.7 to prove lower bounds on the size of monotone span programs. Furthermore, we can add all rank inequalities to this linear program.
Proving lower bounds on the size of shares in linear secretsharing schemes is equivalent to proving lower bounds on the corresponding monotone span programs. In other words, lower bounds on the objective function of the linear program defined in Definition 3.7 after adding all rank inequalities implies lower bounds for linear secret sharing schemes. Thus, our results in Section VI implies the following corollary. Corollary 7.5: All possible rank inequalities with four or five variables and the known to date information inequalities of [25] , [27] , [26] with more than five variables cannot help proving a lower bound of on the size of monotone span programs and the total size of shares in linear secret-sharing schemes even if they are used simultaneously.
Our proof in Section VI that information inequalities with 4 and 5 variables cannot help in proving lower bounds of on the length of shares in secret-sharing schemes uses rank inequalities to prove the results. This proof can be explained in an alternative way. We actually proved that all rank inequalities with 4 and 5 variables cannot prove lower bounds of on the share size in linear secret-sharing schemes. Specifically, this rules out the possibility of proving lower bounds of for general secret-sharing schemes.
The best lower bound on the size of span programs was shown by Gál in [24] (improving on [23] and [46] , see also [47] ). Gál [24] proved an lower bound for the size of monotone span programs, e.g., for the clique problem.
Theorem 7.6 ([24]):
For every , there is an access structure , with parties, for which, in any linear secret-sharing scheme realizing , the share size is times the size of the secret.
The lower bound in Theorem 7.6 is significantly higher than the known lower bound on the size of the shares in general secret-sharing schemes.
Observe that the size of a monotone span program can be also defined as the sum of ranks of the all vector spaces, i.e.,
. Using this definition, lower bounds on the size of monotone span programs can be translated to results on rank inequalities. We first define the notation of a valid point for linear spaces. [24] imply that many points are invalid for linear spaces. By Corollary 7.5, the invalidity of these points does not follow from rank inequalities in up to 5 variables and the known to date information inequalities of [25] , [27] , and [26] and as we consider a set-size inequality . Thus, the induction step follows.
